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INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2001, three warships of the Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Forces (JMSDF or Kaigun) left Sasebo naval base for Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Free-
dom.' This dispatch commenced the first combat theater operations
of the Japanese navy abroad since the end of hostilities in 1945 and
followed the overwhelming Diet approval, two weeks earlier, of the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. On its face the law grants the
' B.A. 2000, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. 2000, University of Pennsylvania; M.A.
2001, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Pennsylvania. I would
like to take this opportunity to thank the many people without whom this Comment
may not have been finished, let alone published. First and foremost, to borrow a
phrase from Michael Bacchus, even the most rococo of constructions could not ap-
propriately reflect the love I feel toward my family. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to
the Associate Editors for their brutally honest and helpful critiques. In addition,
thanks to the Comments Office for shepherding this Comment through the publica-
tion process. I would also like to thank my faculty mentor, Eric Feldman, for providing
useful suggestions during the course of my research and for reading the Comment in
draft form. Thanks are also due to my compatriots Rick Horvath, Eric Marr, and Chris
Williamson for their feedback on the draft copy. Finally, I would like to thank
Mishuku Matsuda for her tireless support of this project and her limitless patience
while I was writing it. Any errors of fact, logic, or admission of course remain entirely
with the author. Please note that all Western names are stated in the Western fashion
with the given name preceding the family name. Japanese names, except as signatures
to English language sources in citation (where they appear as in the cited source), fol-
low the East Asian fashion and are given in the reverse order, with the family name
preceding the given name.
The three ships dispatched were the destroyer Kurama, with a displacement of
5200 tons, the destroyer Kirisanme, with a displacement of 4550 tons, and the supply ship
Hanutn, with a displacement of 8100 tons. In total, these three ships caried some
seven hundred members of the JMSDF. Japanese Warships Set Sail, CNN.cOM (Nov. 9,
2001), at http://vw.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/11/08/ret.japan
.warships/.
2 See Foreign Press Center, Diet Passes Antiterrorism Special Measures Law,
http://v.fpcjjp/e/shiryo/jb/0145.html (Nov. 9, 2001) (noting that the bill was en-
acted after 'just three weeks of speedy deliberations in the Diet" by majority vote and
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with the support of the ruling coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), New Conservative Party, and the New K6meit6 Party); Japan Enact6 Law to Help
Fight Terrorism, J.JAPANESE TRADE & INDUSTRY (Jan./Feb. 2002) (detailing the vote and
public support), available at http://www.jef.or.jp/en/ti/200201_004.htm. The Japa-
nese text of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2001/1005terohouan.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2003); a summary in English can be found at The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Lazi:
Tentative English Summary, http://vwww.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001 /anti-
terorism/ 1029terohougaiyon..e.html (Oct. 2001).
The JMSDF together with ground and air forces comprise the "Self-Defense
Forces" (SDF),Japan's de facto military. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
(describing the various forces and legal mechanisms by which they were created). By
some accounts, the SDF is the military with the second largest budget in the world. For
a breakdown of what the budget supports, see Japan Self Defense Forces USDF), Cen-
ter for Defense Information, at http://www.cdi.org/issues/Asia/japanmil.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003). The startling fact that Japan spends so much on its military is
slightly misleading because the SDF budget is capped in practice at one percent of Ja-
pan's GDP. See, for example, Sam Jameson,Japan Not Innately Militaristic, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2001, lttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p5?eo200l0823sj
.htm, which explains:
Since the end of World War lI,Japan has never spent more than 1.8 percent
of its GDP on defense, and that peak came in the 1950s when Japan still had a
tiny economy. Even Japanese military experts who want.Japan to increase its
defense budgets dramatically do not advocate spending more than 1.5 to 1.7
percent of the GDP. And not once since 1986 has the defense budget even
reached the limit of 1 percent of the GDP that was supposed to have been
lifted in that year.
For the second largest economy in the world, this results in a massive total dollar
amount but does not suggest that tle SDF is one of the world's largest, or even best
equipped, militaries. SeeJames E. Auer, Article 9: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 69, 83 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993)
(comparing Japanese and U.S. military capabilities); Robert A. Fisher, The Erosion of
Japanese Pac~tsm: The Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense ;uidelines, 32
CORNELL, INT'L L.J. 393, 401 n.47 (1998) ("[T]he SDF consists of 151,000 ground
troops; a maritime force of 43,000 troops and 160 vessels; and an air force of 45,000
troops and 510 planes."); cf Mike M. Mochizuki, Japan and the Strategic Quadrangle, in
THE STRATEGIC QUADRANGLE 107, 120 (Michael Mandelbaum ed., 1995) ('Japan will
soon have three times as many destroyer-type surface ships and four times as many P-
3C antisubmarine-warfare aircraft as the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Its tactical fighter planes
will number 300 .... which is comparable to the number of fighter aircraft defending
the continental United States.").
Historically speaking, the ships that sailed for Diego Garcia were not technically
the first dispatch of the SDF abroad since 1945. In 1991 four SDF minesweepers were
sent to the Persian Gulf long after hostilities had ceased in the Gulf War. Auer, supra,
at 78-79. Furthermore, in 1950 the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP)
ordered more than ten times as many minesweepers to the coastal waters of Korea in
support of the U.N. action on the peninsula. This dispatch resulted in the sinking of
two minesweepers and the death of one Japanese sailor, with injuries to eight others.
Id. at 79. 1 discount both operations, however, because in 1991 the minesweepers were
operating pursuant to a U.N. resolution and long after the Persian Gulf could rea-
sonably be described as a "combat zone." Similarly, the 1950 minesweepers were act-
ing under SCAP and U.N. auspices and were not dispatched as the result of an inde-
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JMSDF the ability to provide noncombat support to U.S. forces over-
seas in the war on terror, including resupply, repair, and search and
rescue services." More important from a geopolitical standpoint, how-
ever, is that the law coterminously represents a radical departure from
the post-World War II status quo in East Asia. The mobilization of the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF or Jieitai), including the JMSDF, calls into
question the constitutionality of the SDF more clearly than ever be-
fore with the possible consequence of a sea change in what is arguably
the most important bilateral relationship in the world today: the
United States-Japan security alliance.
Japan is unique among the nations of the world in that it constitu-
tionally relinquished its right as a sovereign nation to go to war.' Arti-
cle 9 of the post-World War II constitution provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and or-
der, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be main-
tained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
5
While the prohibition on military buildup in Article 9 appears to be
explicit, revisionist legislators-upset with what they argue was a con-
stitution "imposed" by General Douglas MacArthur and the Supreme
Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and prompted by U.S. offi-
pendent decision of the Japanese government. However, the three ships that sailed on
November 9, 2001, were acting on the sole authority of the Japanese Diet in an action
not sponsored by the U.N. Therefore, their dispatch may properly be described as the
first such deployment since the end of the second World War. In any event, this is the
first time Japanese destroyers have engaged in an action abroad.
See The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law: Tentative English Summary, supra note
2, §§ 2(2)(i), 4 (outlining the activities in whichJapanese forces will participate).
4 For a compelling discussion of the cession of sovereign state authority, see gen-
erally Eric S. Wilensky, A Contractarian Critique of the Theory ofAuto-Limitation: The Fun-
damental Law of International Relations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 2011 (2002).
5 KENPO art. 9 (Japan)..
6 See, e.g., H. Fukui, Twenty Years of Revisionism, in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN:
ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67, at 41 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) (discussing
a form of revisionism, emotional in nature, rooted in the belief that the "MacArthur
Constitution" was forced upon Japan); Y6ichi Higuchi, The Constitution and the Emperor
System: Is Revisionism Alive?, inJAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 57, 59
("[T]he Constitution was indeed imposed by General MacArthur's team ...."). But see
SHOICHI KOSEKI, THE BIRTii OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 194-208 (Ray A.
Moore trans., 1997) (discussingJapanese efforts to strengthen the prohibition in Arti-
cle 9); Auer, supra note 2, at 70-74 (discussing the contested origin of Article 9).
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cials caught up in the exigencies of the Cold War 7 -- have used an in-
herent ambiguity in Article 9 to justify the creation of the SDF." The
justification advanced by these legislators for the creation and main-
tenance of the SDF depends upon a flexible interpretation of "war" as
an aggressive act. By establishing a military on the basis of a right to
"self-defense," the Japanese Diet has sidestepped the constitution; but
this is only logically tenable to the extent that the SDF concerns itself
solely with the defense ofJapan.
The American framers of the Japanese constitution intended that,
like the U.S. Constitution, the document they drafted for Diet ap-
proval would be the "supreme law of the nation."' To safeguard the
constitution's primacy, the framers placed significant hurdles in the
path of would-be revisionist legislators. Article 96, in particular, pro-
vides that amendments to the constitution may only be made by a two-
thirds affirmative vote in both houses of the Diet and with ratification
by a majority of the electorate.'" In the post-War Japanese milieu both
SCAP and the Diet's own constitutional commission believed that
such stringent requirements were necessary to ensure constitutional
stability and to prevent a backslide from the newly instituted demo-
cratic ideals of the "MacArthur Constitution" to the imperialist ones of
the prewar Meiji Constitution." The effect of Article 96 is to make re-
vision of the constitution "'either extremely difficult or next to impos-
7 There is significant scholarship suggesting that the SDF and its precursor, tile
National Police Reserve, were the product of American Cold War paranoia. For a pr6-
cis, see PETERJ. HERZOG, JAPAN'S PSEUDO-DEMOCRAcY 224-31 (1993).
For example, while the second clause of Article 9 provides that "land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained," it does not rule out
a defensive capability if the "war" of"war potential" is read as an aggressive conflict or,
better yet, belligerence. This is one explanation for the circumlocution that provides
the SDF with its name. The creative interpretation of Article 9 also extends to the ac-
tual makeup of the SDF. For example, theJMSDF does not maintain an aircraft car-
rier, the inherent purpose of which is the projection of force. See Chris Ajemian, The
1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines Under the Japanese Constitution and Their lm/plicationsfor
U.S. Foreign P'olicy, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 323, 327 n.28 (1998) ("[A] fighter jet may
have guns, but no bombs.").
KENPO art. 98 (Japan).
I0 /d. at art. 96.
11 See JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTIrurION: THE FINAL REPORT 345-50
(Sch. of Law, Univ. of Wash., Asian Law Series No. 7,John M. Maki trans., 1980) (de-
scribing the debate the constitutional commission had in 1946 over the strict language
of Article 96 and providing a summary of the major positions). For an overview of the
Meiji Constitution's provisions, see SHINICHI FUIII, THE ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. reprint ed. 1979) (n.d.); N. MATSUNAMI,
THIEJAIANESE CONS"ImTUTION AND POLIIICS (Univ. Publ'ns of Am. reprint ed. 1979)
(1940).
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sible."''- As a consequence, the Diet avoids the need for revision
through use of judicial precedents, administrative practices, and cir-
cumlocutions such as that employed to describe the SDF.'' Under or-
dinary conditions these methods afford maximum maneuverability
while assuring the Japanese public, as well as Japan's allies and neigh-
bors, that the Diet acts within the scope of its grant of power.
The deployment of JMSDF vessels to the Afghani theater, how-
ever, represents a departure from the "self-defense" rhetoric of the
SDF's supporters and could be a material breach of the prohibitions
embodied in Article 9. While initial public reaction in Japan has
strongly favored the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and sup-
port of the U.S. war on terror, 4 Japanese opposition parties, in par-
ticular the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), have vociferously ob-
jected to what they contend is a "distort[ion of] constitutional
principles to justify the dispatch of SDF units abroad."'5 Similarly, Ja-
pan's neighbors, long sensitive to the possible reemergence of Japa-
nese militarism,"' viewed the dispatch of JMSDF units unfavorably.
North Korea, for one, has argued: "'This [law allowing SDF participa-
tion in the war on terror] indicates that the Japanese reactionaries,
who have stepped up their moves for military power and militarization
of Japan, took a very dangerous step forward for overseas aggres-
1 JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT, suna note 11,
at 350 (quoting the conclusion of a majority of the commissioners regarding the re-
quirements for amendment). Indeed, according to Lawrence Beer and Hiroshi ltoh,
the constitution has never been revised or amended. LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI
ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OFJAPAN, 1970 TIIROUGH 1990, at 12 (1996).
11. JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT, supra note 11,
at 350.
1 Two opinion surveys by majorJapanese dailies, one by the Mainichi Shimbun and
one by the Asahi Shimbun, indicate that a majority of the Japanese electorate supports
both the dispatch of the SDF to provide logistical support in the war on terror (sixty-
three percent) and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (fifty-one percent). Yuki
Tatsumi, a/an's Homeland Security: Police, or Self-Defense Forces?, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, at http://www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw0204.htm (Apr. 26,
2002).
15 Interview by Hayano Toru with Fuwa Tetsuze, Central Committee Chair, Japa-
nese Communist Party, at http://www.jcp.or.jp/english/jps-weekly/2001-12-fuwa
.htnd (last visited Apr. 30, 2003).
16 See Matthew J. Gilley, Comment, Japan's Developing Military Potential Within the
Context of Its Constitutional Renunciation of War, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1681, 1694
(2000) ('Japan's Asian neighbors... remain vigilant against the resurgence of a strong
Japanese military that could destabilize Asia .... Article 9 ... offers assurance to these
countries thatJapan has no intention of revisiting its imperialist past .... ).
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sion .... ,,,7 These nations, together with the opposition parties in Ja-
pan, contend that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is incon-
sistent with the purposes of Article 9 and even the flexible interpreta-
tion of Article 9 used tojustify the SDF's existence.' According to a
group ofJapanese constitutional scholars:
The [law's] intent is to conduct "cooperation and support activities"
including supply, repairs, servicing, medical care, and the transport of
weapons, ammunition, and personnel, but assuming that the use of force
is impossible without such help, this support is an essential part of mili-
tary action, and is therefore clearly participation in war. This would be
the first participation in the use of force byJapan's military apparatus in
the postwar years, and would clearly violate Article 9 of Japan's Constitu-
tion ....
While the potential ramifications of the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law for the SDF and Article 9 are serious, the dispatch in
November of three JMSDF ships additionally implicates the future bi-
lateral security relationship between Japan and the United States un-
der the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.0
Based on the terms of this agreement and subsequent implementation
"Guidelines,"2' the Japanese and U.S. militaries are pledged to con-
duct bilateral defense planning and assist each other in the event of
an attack on Japan or "a situation in areas surrounding Japan. In
accord with the principles of the constitution, including Article 9, the
terms of the Guidelines limit the SDF's contributions to the alliance
7 N Korea Citicizes Antiterrorism Law, JAPAN TODAY (Nov. 5, 2001), at http://
www.japantoday.com/gidx/newsl51666.html (quoting an editorial printed in North
Korea's official Rodong Sinmun newspaper).
18 See An Uigent Appeal from Japan's Constitutional Scholars, Japan Computer Access
(Oct. 9, 2001), at http://www.jca.apc.org/-kenpoweb/appeal-eng.html (doubting the
constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law).
LI Id. Eric Feldman suggested, in a notation to this Comment in draft form, that
this group is a leftist organization opposed to the existence of the SDF in principle. I
was not able to determine the veracity of his claim.
20 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 1I U.S.T.
1632. This treaty marks an expansion of rights and obligations under the previous se-
curity arrangement, signed in 1951, Security Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T.
3329.
21 See, e.g., The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Sept. 23, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1621 (1997) [hereinafter Guidelines] (constituting a collaborative outline of
policies drawn up by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation that superceded the
previous 1978 guidelines).
22 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. V; see also Murata Kji, Do the New Guidelines
Make the Japan-U.S. Alliance More Effective, in THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (Nishihara Masashi ed., 2000) (discussing the
1997 Guidelines and the United States-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War context).
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for certain actions. In practice, this means the SDF is only committed
to providing rear-area support, nonoffensive information gathering,
and minesweeping in the event of a conflict outside of Japan. 2 ' Al-
though the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law meets these limita-
tions, Afghanistan likely does not qualify as an ."area surrounding Ja-
pan. 2' Japanese participation in the war on terror, at least insofar as
it occurs outside the Guidelines' operational area, is therefore an ex-
pansion of the SDF's role in the joint security relationship. Further-
more, the use of weapons, albeit strictly confined to cases of self-
defense or necessity, is not as tightly controlled under the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law as under the previous SDF principle• • • 25
of nonparticipation. The expanded role of the SDF thus calls into
question the existing security arrangement between the United States
and Japan, even as it raises the precedent question of whether the SDF
and its actions in support of the war on terror are constitutional.
This Comment will assess the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law under the strictures of Article 9 and its subsequent interpretation
by Japanese courts and the Diet to determine both the constitutional-
ity of the SDF's participation in the war on terror and the probable re-
sponse of the majority coalition to the arguments of the opposition
parties. In addition, the Comment will look to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security to discern possible implications for the fu-
ture of the United States-Japan alliance. Toward those ends, Part I
considers the circumstances surrounding the adoption of Article 9
and its diachronically asynchronous interpretation from 1947 to the
promulgation of the 1997 Guidelines. Part II examines the Guide-
lines in brief, with particular attention to the role of the SDF in U.S.-
23 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. V; see also Michael J. Green, Interests, Asymme-
tries, and Strategic Choices, in THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
PROSPECTS FOR INCREMENTAL CHANGE 1, 8 (1998) (contending that adoption of the
Guidelines is predicated on accepting only a limited role of the SDF in "rear-area" co-
operation and not pushing for SDF "collective defense" cooperation).
24 While Article V of the Guidelines declares that "areas surrounding Japan" is not
a geographical concept, but rather a situational one, there must still be a geographical
construct operating or else better language would likely have been chosen. For a dis-
cussion of the geographical/situational contrast, see Murata, supra note 22, at 31-32.
25 See Diet Passes Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, supra note 2, http://
www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/jb/0145.html ("SDF personnel were previously allowed to use
their weapons only in self-defense."); see also The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law:
Tentative English Summaty, supra note 2, at art. 12, para. 10 (prohibiting the use of
weapons by SDF personnel except in cases of self-defense or necessity when a senior
officer so orders, or when "offense or danger to [the] lives and bodies" of SDF person-
nel or refugees is "too imminent" to wait for permission).
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led military actions (as opposed to search and rescue activities). Parts
1II, IV, and V address the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Spe-
cial Measures Law and the subsequent "Basic Plan" implementing the
law. Part III provides an analysis of the relevant provisions of the law
together with a history of the law's execution and a preliminary sketch
of the law's intersection with Article 9. Parts IV and V discuss, respec-
tively, the judicial and legislative responses to the limitations of Article
9 and the continued existence of the SDF. Finally, Part VI presents
some possible consequences for Article 9 and the joint security ar-
rangement between the United States and Japan brought on by the
Special Measures Law. The Conclusion explores an alternative solu-
tion to what the Comment posits may be the ignominious end of the
world's sole "peace constitution.
'2 6
I. FROM 1947 TO 1997: FinYYEARS OF ARTICLE 9 EXEGESIS
A. In the Beginning
The origins of Article 9 are unclear,27 but the desire to completely
disarm and demilitarize the Japanese archipelago was one of the prin-
ciple aims of the Occupation.2 " General MacArthur, who was charged
with administering the Occupation through SCAP, sought to establish
a "peaceful and responsible government" in Japan that would "respect
the rights of other states and ... support the objectives of the United
States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter of the
United Nations."2 ' This goal, MacArthur believed, had two precursive
26 See GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION:
DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 16 (2001) (using the term "peace constitution," discussing
the restriction on "war potential," and noting some of the unsuccessful constitutional
challenges). While I cite Hook and McCormack for the phrase "peace constitution,"
the description has been applied by a broad range of scholars to the Japanese constitu-
tion because of Article 9. For another example, see Susan V. Thompson,Japan Takes
up Anns, MoveOn Peace (July 3, 2002), at http://www.peace.inoveon.org/
bulletin36.php3.
27 There is some dispute over the proper source for the idea behind Article 9. Ac-
cording to Auer, s.upra note 2, at 71, General MacArthur clained the idea for a "no-
war" clause originated with then Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro. In contradiction,
Shidehara's Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru maintained that the idea had been pro-
posed to Shidehara by MacArthur and that the Prime Minister had acquiesced. Id.
28 HERZOG, supra note 7, at 218 (citing the "United States Initial Post-Surrender
Policy forJapan," approved by President Harry Truman on September 6, 1945). For a
good overview of pre-Occupation planning, see HUGH BORTON, AMERICAN
PRESURRENDER PLANNING FOR POS'II, ARJAIPAN (1967).
29 HERZOG, st1/ra note 7, at 218.
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components: (1) elimination of any potential for remilitarization of
Japanese society; and (2) establishment of a democratic order based
on popular sovereignty with a total repudiation of the feudal order
that characterized the Meiji state."
To achieve these aims, and to safeguard them in perpetuity,
MacArthur advised the Higashikuni cabinet to revise the Meiji Consti-
tution to conform to the goal of the Occupation." The Shidehara
cabinet, which took over the task of constitutional reform from the
Higashikuni cabinet, was unable to produce a draft constitution that
satisfied MacArthur. MacArthur accordingly ordered SCAP's Gov-
ernment Section to produce a version that contained the components
he felt were essential to make Japan a "peaceful and responsible gov-
ernment." Among the points he instructed the Government Section
to include was a precursor to Article 9:
"War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces
it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even fin- preserving its
own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the
world for its defense and protection.
3 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 396-97 (commenting on Article 9 and MacArthur's
goals forJapanese pacifism and democracy); see also HOOK & MCCORMACK, sUlyra note
26, at 5 (analyzing both the conflict and cooperation expressed by a symbolic emperor
and democratic ideals).
Despite having complete control of Japan during the Occupation pursuant to
the Instrument of Surrender, SCAP generally did not directly govern Japanese affairs.
Rather, SCAP issued directives to the Japanese government to undertake the actions it
desired. These directives were known as "SCAPIN," with "IN" referring to the index
number of the directive. BEER & ITOH, supra note 12, at 9-4; see also Gaimusho tokubetsu
shi~yobu hen, Nihon sentyo oyobi kanri juyo bunshoshu 1-96 (1947) (collecting documents of
theJapanese foreign minisuy implementing SCAPIN commands). For an explanation
of the necessity of constitutional reform, see Dale Sonnerberg & Donald A. Timm, The
Agreement Regarding Status of Foreign Farces in Japan, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
VISITING FORCES 379 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001), which states:
It was hoped that, with this Constitution to define the powers and limits of
government and the guidance and oversight of SCAP to help with the transi-
tion, the philosophy of Rule of Law would be instilled in the Japanese system,
transforming it into something resembling a liberal Western democracy. As
the new philosophy took root, the SCAP administration would gradually fade
into the background and ultimately disappear.
Id. at 382.
32 1 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, POLITICAL REORIENTATION
OFJAPAN, SEPTEMBER 1945 TO SEPTEMBER 1948, at 99 (1949) (criticizing the Shidehara
draft, also known as the Matsumoto draft, as "far behind even the most conservative of
the unofficial drafts").
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"No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no
rights of belligerency will ever be conferred on any Japanese force. ''S'1
The Government Section's draft that was presented to the Japa-
nese government omitted the "even for preserving its own security"
language but otherwise adopted, with slight alterations, MacArthur's
point as Article 8 (subsequently renumbered as Article 9). '  The
Japanesegovernment was reportedly shocked at the breadth of the Ar-
ticle, but felt that there was little they could do to oppose the Occupa-
tion's version since MacArthur had personally pushed for its adop-
tion.-5
Accepting the principle of renouncing war as the sovereign right
of the nation and agreeing to the complete and permanent disanna-
ment of Japan, however, were two entirely different things. In both
the Privy Council and the House of Representatives, Article 9 (in par-
ticular the second paragraph) raised the question of whether the
abandonment of "war" should include a concomitant rejection of the
right of self-defense. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru gave his opinion
that the Article 9 concept of "war" embraced both aggressive confla-
grations and defensive actions, and he noted that "'most modern wars
have been waged in the name of the self-defense of States.''" Conse-
33 OSAMu Nisi-i, THE CONSTITuriON AND TIE NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW SYSTEM IN
JAPAN 73 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Notes from General MacArthur to Briga-
dier General Whitney, Chief of the Government Section (Feb. 3, 1946)).
3,t See Auer, supra note 2, at 71 (describing the incarnations of this Article). Ac-
cording to Auer, the full text of Article 8 read:
[1.] War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of
force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations.
[2.] No army, navy, air force or otherwar potential will ever be authorized
and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.
id.
The "even for preserving its own security" language was apparently deleted by the
Government Section because the Section's deputy chief, Col. Charles L. Kades, felt
every country was entitled to self-preservation. Id. at 72 (citing NISHI, supra note 33, at
8-9).
3r Cf id. at 71-72 (describing the Shidehara cabinet's misinformed belief that
MacArthur, rather than Shidehara, drafted Article 9). Yoshida's response to question-
ing by Ambassador Nomura Kichisabur6 during the Privy Council debate on the draft
indicates the compliant attitude of his government: "'Article 9 is the outcome of
American apprehension about Japanese rearmament. Consequently it is difficult to
revise it."' Id. at 72. Nomura's response is the crux of revisionist attack on Article 9:
"'Absolute submission to the Potsdam Declaration requires the disarmament of the
Japanese military but does not require a renunciation of armament forever."' Id. at 72-
73.
36 KOSEKI, supra note 6, at 193 (quoting Dai 90 kai teikoku gikai shugiin giji sokkiroku,
no. 8, at 123 (June 29, 1946)).
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quently, Yoshida argued, "'Maintenance of security has to be through
the Occupation Army even when UJapan is] attacked since [Japan is]
not allowed [re]armament.' - 7 Although Yoshida changed his mind
on the meaning of "war" by 1954, his interpretation became the offi-
cial position of the government until the reorganization of the Na-
tional Safety Forces (NSF or Hoan tai) that created the SDF in 1954."
B. Ambiguities and the Ashida Amendment. The Adoption of Article V9"
The Diet's review of the draft constitution prepared by SCAP en-
tailed the creation of a seventy-two-member Special Committee on
Revision of the Imperial Constitution in the first post-War House of
Representatives (elected April 10, 1946), which received the draft
constitution in late June. The Committee was charged with producing
an amended draft for Diet approval that would incorporate changes
they felt were necessary to 'Japanize" the American text.' The Com-
mittee met in secret from July 25 to August 20 under the chairman-
ship of the Liberal Party's Ashida Hitoshi, who received SCAP's ap-
proval because of his liberal tendencies."'  Indeed, many of the
Committee's proposals, such as adding a House of Councilors to re-
place the Privy Council (which would vote itself out of existence when
it adopted the revised draft), were adopted without SCAP interfer-42
ence. Nevertheless, it was this Committee and, in particular, Chair-
man Ashida's revision of Article 9 that would give rise to the ambigui-
ties exploited by revisionist legislators to create andjustify' the SDF.
37 Auer, supra note , at 72.
8 KOSEKI, supra note 6, at 193. Ater states that Yoshida's view became the commu-
nis opinio doctomm taught in law schools and universities, and that even junior and sen-
ior high school students were taught that "'Japan retained a right of national self-
defense in international law [according to the principles of the U.N. Charter], but by
virtue of the second paragraph [of Article 9], she could not... maintain an armed
force-even for purposes of national self-defense."' Auer, suna note 2, at 74 (quoting
Kenz6 Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, in TiHE
CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRsT TWENITYYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 6, at 71, 86).
As space and time permit only a cursory review of this pivotal constitutional de-
bate, the interested reader is encouraged to attend to the discussion that appears in
KOSEKI, supra note 6, at 192-208, which provides an excellent summary of the Ashida
amendment controversy together with relevant quotations from all interested parties.
40 See id. at 168-69 (describing the process by which the Committee amended the
text). The term 'Japanize" is used by Koseki to describe Japanese efforts to rein in
some of the more egregiously liberal departures from the Meiji Constitution's ideation
of rights and relationships in the empire. See id. at 111-40 (comparing the American
andJapanese versions of the text).
41 Id. at 170.
42 BEER & 1rITOH, supra note 12, at 13.
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Ashida's proposed amendment, while largely leaving the language
of the SCAP draft intact, made two significant additions. The first
change was the semi-rhetorical flourish at the beginning of the first
paragraph: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based onjus-
tice and order .. '"'i This clause apparently was added to divorce the
draft of Article 9 from the reality of its composition; that is, as an im-
position the Diet was forced to accept because of Japan's military de-
feat."" Whatever its original intent, however, this additional clause
fundamentally redirected the thrust of the first paragraph of Article 9
from a per se renunciation of war to a pro forma repudiation of mili-
tarism. That is to say that the Committee's language provides a ra-
tionale for renouncing war as a sovereign right of the nation and
thereby changes the goal of Article 9 to one of fostering "international
peace based on justice and order." By itself, the first addition pro-
posed by the Committee was probably not fatal to the pacifist inten-
tions of the SCAP drafters. Taken together with the second addition,
however, Article 9 becomes ambiguous.
The second change Ashida proposed was the addition to the be-
ginning of the second paragraph of the clause: "In order to achieve
the purpose of the preceding paragraph .... If one accepts that
the "purpose" of the preceding paragraph, by reason of the first addi-
tion, was no longer a renunciation of war in all respects, but instead a
rejection of war as a policy tool (i.e., as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes) because "international peace" must be based on 'jus-
tice and order," then the subsequent declaration that Japan will not
maintain "war potential" takes on a different cast. By this interpreta-
tion, Article 9 is not absolute in denying the Japanese a military. In-
stead, the prohibition only reaches "war potential" maintained for of-
fensive purposes; "war potential" is acceptable so long as it is
maintained for the purpose of self-defense and not for disturbing in-
ternational peace.'
43 KENPO art. 9, para.1 (Japan).
KOSEKI, sup/ra note 6, at 194 (citing Committee member lnukai Takero's expla-
nation of the addition, Ken/.5 kaisei shoiinkai himitisu gijiroku (Kiyoshi Mori ed., 1983)).
If the clause was added to dissuade later critics from arguing that the constitution had
been imposed, it has singularly failed to achieve its purpose. Legislators still claim that
the 1946 constitution is "MacArthur's Constitution." See sources cited supra note 6 for
discussion of MacArthur's influence over the adoption of the constitution.
.1r, KENI'O art. 9, para.2 (Japan).
A6 There is contradictory evidence regarding whether Ashida intended the addi-
tions made in committee to encompass such a broad reading. In his book, which ap-
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The rhetorical loophole thus created by the Ashida amendment to
Article 9 immediately concerned the Occupation authorities after the
Article's approval by the House of Representatives in late August. The
Chinese delegation to the Far East Commission (FEC) objected to the
implicit "danger" embodied in the Ashida amendment because "'if
Japan will be allowed to maintain armed forces for other purposes
than those enumerated [in Article 9], that means there is [a] possibil-
ity for Japan to employ such armed forces under certain pretexts, such
as, for instance, self-defense. '" The British, Canadian, and Australian
representatives at the FEC raised similar concerns.5  MacArthur ap-
parently agreed with the representatives that the text of Article 9, as
amended by Ashida's Committee, "contain[ed] implications which
could not be acceptable to [the Occupation]."1 Yet, in spite of the
troubling aspects of the Ashida version, MacArthur believed that addi-
tional provisions in the constitution, such as universal suffrage (Article
15) and the requirement that the Prime Minister and all Ministers of
State be civilians (Article 66), provided sufficient guarantees that any
future rearmament ofJapan under Article 9 would be precluded'
peared on November 3, 1946, the same day the new constitution was promulgated,
Ashida argued:
The renunciation of war and the threat of use of force in Article 9 refers to a
means of resolving an international dispute. If applied to a real case, it would
be an aggressive war. Consequently, this provision does not renounce war and
the use of force for the purposes of self-defense.
KOSEKI, supra note 6, at 194 (quoting Ashida hiloshi nikki 319 (Shind6 Eiichi ed.,
1986)). Koseki contends that Ashida's arguments are disingenuous. He avers that the
potential for rearmament made possible by the additions was inadvertent ab initio, but
that Ashicla and most of the Committee realized after the close of the amendment de-
bates that they had stumbled on a loophole that would permit the creation of some-
thing like the SDF. See id. at 200 ("[N]ot one member-including Chairman Ashida-
thought that inserting the words 'in order to accomplish the aim of the previous para-
graph' would be sanctioning war in self-defense or sanctioning the maintenance of war
potential for the purpose of self-defense.").
-17 Id. at 202 (quoting Transcript of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Far Eastern
Commission, Sept. 21, 1946, at 18-19 (National Diet Library, microfiche FEC
(A)0085)).
48 See id. at 204 (summarizing the British, Canadian, and Australian representa-
tives' reservations about the amendment).
'19 Id. at 206 (quoting Transcript of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Far Eastern
Commission, Sept. 25, 1946, at 8-9 (National Diet Library, microfiche FEC (A)0085)).
50 Id. at 205-06. MacArthur may have thought that the Japanese people, having
just endured the most horrific war in human history, would be ill-disposed to electing
militarists. Furthermore, the requirement that the cabinet offlicials be civilians, de-
fined as "persons without military service," id. at 205, was no doubt aimed at the par-
ticular abuses of the prewar Meiji system, wherein militat), oficers were able to co-opt
the institutions of the Diet to militarize the entire nation.
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C. Birth of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement
While the Occupation may have begun with the goal of total dis-
armament and demilitarization of Japan, by 1950 MacArthur had rea-
son to regret a literal interpretation of Article 9. The outbreak of the
Korean War on June 25, 1950, required the transfer of significant
numbers of SCAP forces to the Korean peninsula, leaving Japan
largely undefended. Perhaps fearful that Japan was proportionately
destabilized by the absence of his army, and therefore prone to com-
munist aggression, MacArthur authorized the creation of a 75,000-
man National Police Reserve (NPR) to safeguard Japanese internal se-
curity." In addition, he began to argue that SCAP had never intended
the demilitarization of Japan to prevent "'any and all steps for the
preservation of the nation.' 5 1 "'Japan as a sovereign nation,"' it was
avowed, "'possessed the inherent right of self-preservation,"' which in
SCAP parlance apparently meantJapan had a right to maintain a mili-
tary for self-defense)' This argument in turn was part of a general
diplomatic effort by the United States to obtain a commitment from
the Yoshida government to rearm Japan as a bulwark against commu-
nism or, in the alternative, send troops to fight in Korea on behalf of
the U.N. while wearing U.S. uniforms.'
Yoshida resisted American pressure to rearm, positing that, "' [T] o
maintain war potential, even for the purpose of self-defense, would
mean rearmament. This would necessitate revision of the Constitu-
51 HERZOG, supra note 7, at 224.
52 Auer, supra note 2, at 72 (quoting DOUGLAS MAcARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 304
(1964)). MacArthur's dubious contention was part of a general "reverse course" in the
Occupation, noted by lapanologists. See generally GARY D. AILINSONJAPAN'S POSTWAR
HISTORY 53-55 (1997) (describing the shift in American policy toward Germany and
Japan "away from punishment toward reconstruction" by 1947, and stating that
[i] nstead of punishing japan, SCAIP turned to embracing.Japan as an ally in its war
against cJmmunisnl"). It is worth noting that MacArthurjustified the creation of the
NPR on sell'dCfense grounds, but did not hesitate to use NPR minesweepers during
the Korean War to clear beaches around the peninsula. See supra note 2 and accom-
panying text (recounting the use of japanese minesweepers in 1950).
, KOSEKI, supra note 6, at 201 (quoting Colonel Charles L. Kades, a member of
SCAP's Government Section, who contended that the omission of the "even for pre-
serving its own security" language in the original draft, and the nonobjection of the
U.S. representatives in the Occupation to the Ashida amendment were consistent with
SCAP's intent not to deny the Japanese government the ability to defend itself against
foreign aggression).
See EIRZOG, supra note 7, at 224 ("Senator Warren Magnuson introduced a bill
which would have authorised the voltntary enlistment of Japanese in the U.S.
Forces."); HOOK & MCCORINACK, su/na note 26, at 13 ("Japan was called upon to mobi-
lize a 300,000-man army to support the U.S. effort in Korea .... ).
FROM JAPAN TO AFGHANISTAN
tion. '-55 Revision, Yoshida must have known, would be a Sisyphean
task under the stringent requirements of the constitution." Further-
more, rearmament was hardly a viable economic option for Yoshida's
government, which had been struggling to rebuild the Japanese econ-
omy and put an end to the shortages that had plagued Japan since the
end of the war. He did, however, ultimately acquiesce in the crea-
tion of the NPR, provided that the paramilitary organization excluded
purged "professional militarists. In so doing, Yoshida had to create
a variety of neologisms to avoid open conflict with Article 9.59 He
eventually had to reverse his earlier position and claim that "war po-
tential" maintained for self-defense was not precluded by Article 9,
adopting the ex post facto rationale offered by Ashida for the
amendment language."
The Peace Treaty of San Francisco,'' signed on September 8, 1951,
brought the Occupation to an end and marked another milestone in
the rearmament ofJapan. Pursuant to Article 5(c),Japan was permit-
ted to enter into collective security arrangements,'2 which Japan's rep-
resentatives in San Francisco promptly formed with the United States.
Signed the same day as the Peace Treaty, the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty';' contemplates in the preamble a radically expanded and per-
manent role for the NPR:
55 Auer, supra note 2, at 74.
51; See supra note 12 and accompanying text (observing the constraints on amend-
ment of the Japanese constitution).
57 See ALLINSON, supra note 52, at 45-82 (describing the post-War Japanese eco-
nomic condition and SCAP reforms aimed at resuscitating a Japan that had been re-
duced in the war to yaki-nohara, or "burned plains").
-s HERZOG, supra note 7, at 224. The prohibition against "professional militarists"
did not extend to former officers and enlisted men of the Imperial Army below the
rank of general, and many found themselves reactivated as members of the NPR.
Auer, sulra note 2, at 74.
59 Auer, supra note 2, at 74, gives the example of NPR tanks being relabeled "spe-
cial vehicles."
Id. at 74-75 (positing that "war potential" differed from "defense potential").
61 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951,3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.
62 See id. at art. 5(c) ("The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a
sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may vol-
untarily enter into collective security arrangements."). The right to enter into collec-
tive security arrangements may be confused with the right of collective self-defense,
which the Japanese government believed was barred by Article 9 (notwithstanding the
language referring to "collective self-defense" in the Treaty of Peace with Japan and
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty). For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part Ill.
63 Security Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3329.
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The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has
the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the
Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an in-
herent right of individual and collective self-defense.
In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrange-
ment for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain
armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack
upon Japan.
The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is
presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and aboutJa-
pan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume
responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, al-
ways avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve
other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter. 4
Accepting this language committed the Yoshida government to a re-
armament program and a necessary reorganization and expansion of
the NPR, which had heretofore effectively served as an auxiliary to
Occupation forces in Japan. The raison d'&tre for the reorganization
is hinted at in the preamble: Japan's military would have to be purely
defensive in nature, and therefore of limited capabilities. But the
Treaty does not indicate what the boundaries of those capabilities
should be. In essence, then, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at once
reified the Ashida amendment's theoretical exception to Article 9
while making it incumbent upon the Japanese government to actually
create a self-defense force.
Following the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japa-
nese rearmament started apace. In 1952, the NPR was combined with
a maritime component to form the NSF,65 an organization that was
"unqtuestionably military" in character."' In 1953, Japan entered into
talks with the United States over a plan to incrementally build up its
forces in order to achieve the minimum troop levels required by the
Mutual Security Assistance program in exchange for economic incen-
tives. The closing months of 1953 and the first six months of 1954
64 Id. at 3331 (emphasis added).
Auer, supra note 2, at 76. Auer describes this existing maritime component, the
Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), as "Japan's coast guard." Id.
HERZOG, sulyra note 7, at 226.
67 See generally id., at 226-28 (discussing this rapid series of events). The Mutual
Security Assistance program required each country seeking economic aid from the
United States (in the form of grants, loans, and reduced barriers to trade) to maintain
armament sufficient to contribute to the defense of the "Free World." Id. at 227.
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saw yet another iteration of a revived Japanese military, as the NSF
combined with a new air-defense component under the auspices of
the Defense Agency Establishment Law (B6eich6 Setchi-h6) and the
Self-Defense Forces Law (Jieitai-h6) to form the SDF.'" By 1955, as far
as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was concerned, the SDF
position vis-?t-vis Article 9 was summed up in an official statement:
"'[T]he case of military power as a means of defending the nation
when the nation has been attacked by military power is not counter to
the Constitution.'" As Peter Herzog wryly described this period,
"[t]he transition from 'police' to 'army' [was] unmistakable.""
In 1960, over domestic protests that would bring down his gov-
ernment, Kishi Nobusuke signed the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security and thereby laid the cornerstone for the
United States-Japan bilateral relationship. The new treaty was ostensi-
bly a revision of the old U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but in fact it
augured a shift to a more equitable relationship between the United
States andJapan than had been the case inder the 1951 arrangement.
For example, while preserving the same quintessential rights and obli-
gations as under the 1951 Treaty, the 1960 agreement qualifies U.S.
base rights in Japan and makes mutual consultation a regular feature
of the relationship for use of its Japanese bases.7 Furthermore, pur-
suant to the Article IV requirement to "consult together from time to
time regarding the implementation of this Treaty," the United States
and Japan committed themselves to developing a substantive military1 2
structure for defense cooperation. This development has resulted in
the periodic issuance of Guidelines to govern their commitment to
68 See Auer, supra note 2, at 76-78 (noting that the NPR formed the basis for the
Ground Self-Defense Forces (IGSDF or Rikugun), the MSA, and the JMSDF; and the
new air force component became the Air Self-Defense Forces (JASDF or Kuugun));
HERZOG, supra note 7, at 230 (describing the Self-Defense Forces Law as providing "the
transition from.., maintaining peace and order within Japan to a force to counter
outside aggression").
69 Auer, supJra note 2, at 76 (quoting K. MASUHLARA, NIHON NO BOEI 58 (1961)).
71) HERZOG, sula note 7, at 230.
71 See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 20, at arts. IV-VI
(agreeing that the respective parties will cooperate with each other and that the
United States may use bases in Japan). Article IV is indicative of the "mutual" element
of the Treaty: "The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the im-
plementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security
ofJapan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened."
2 See Murata, supra note 22, at 24-32 (discussing bilateral efforts to define the lim-
its of defense cooperation between the U.S. military and the SDF).
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one another under the Treaty. The most recent promulgation of
Guidelines occurred in 1997.7:
II. "AREAS SURROUNDINGJAPAN": THE SDF AND THE 1997 GUIDELINES
The 1997 Guidelines were an attempt to redefine the security rela-
tionship for a post-Cold War era. With the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion in 1991, the military threat that had long been the sine qua non of
the mutual security arrangement disappeared, and analysts on both
sides of the Pacific looked for a new ratio vivendi for the United
States-Japan alliance•.7 Due to continuing instability in the Asia-Pacific
region, particularly the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, the new direc-
tion was to expand upon the original goal of defending Japan from
external aggression to include operations aimed at restoring regional
stability to "areas surrounding Japan." ' Morimoto Satoshi, a member
of Japan's prestigious Nomura Research Institute, described the 1996
Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security that gave rise to the 1997
Guidelines as "the most significant turning point for the [United
States-Japan] alliance since the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty., 711 In
fact, the 1997 Guidelines work two even more fundamental changes in
the alliance structure than Morimoto could have predicted.
A. Attack on Japan
The 1997 Guidelines continue to place emphasis on the bilateral
commitment to repulse armed aggression against Japan, but reduce
the U.S. military's role to support of the SDF, which now has "primary• 77
responsibility" for conducting defensive operations. Previously, the
SDF was largely an auxiliary force for the U.S. military's defense of Ja-
pan with the narrow obligation of repelling "limited, small-scale ag-
73 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting the adoption of the Guidelines
for U.S.-apan Defense Cooperation).74
See Murata, supra note 22, at 21 ("[W]ith the ideological conflict of the cold war
over,... the current argument for retaining the alliance has shifted to its multifunc-
tional character.").
7 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. I.
Satoshi Morimoto, A TighterJapan-U.S. Alliance Based on Greater Trust, in TOWARD
A TRUE ALLIANCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S.-JAPAN SECURI'IY RELATIONS 137, 137 (Mike M.
Mochizuki ed., 1997).
77 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. IV.
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gression.,,78 The 1997 Guidelines reflect the growing disengagement
of the United States from its allies, at least in terms of bearing the fi-
nancial costs of deployment, and the unwillingness of the United
States to lose personnel in a fight it does not start itself.79 Without an-
other "superpower" to contend with, the rationale seems to be that
the SDF has modernized itself to an extent sufficient to preserve the
security of Japan. But increased responsibility of the SDF is neverthe-
less conditioned on the "limitations of [Japan's] Constitution" (al-
though the Guidelines do not refer to any particular provision) .9
Thus, it is conceivable that the United States may have to intervene
militarily in situations when the threat to Japan originates in "areas
surrounding Japan" but the SDF potentially would be constitutionally
prohibited from acting.
B. The SDF's Role in "Areas Surrounding Japan"
The 1997 Guidelines move beyond the security ofJapan proper by
creating a role for the SDF in "areas surrounding Japan." Article V of
the Guidelines provides that the term "areas surrounding Japan" is to
be defined by the situation, without reference to geography. "' In-
cluded in the definition of "situation" are all events that "will have an
important influence on Japan's peace and security. '82 The rather
amorphous language is no doubt intended to provide flexibility to the
SDF to act in support of the United States should the two Koreas be-
gin another conflict or should China move aggressively to reassert its
sovereignty over Taiwan, since either instance would involve the dis-
patch of U.S. forces to the region and the increased use of Japanese
bases. The ambiguity of the phrase, however, leaves the range of cir-
78 K~ji Murata, Japan's Militaty Cooperation and Alliances in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, in THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THIE ASIA-
PACIFIC 52, 55 (Hung-mao Tien & Tun-jen Cheng eds., 2000).
79 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 404 (highlighting that the Guidelines reflect "a re-
duced willingness on the part of the United States to bear the financial and personnel
costs of defending its allies, including Japan"). For a provocative introduction to the
costs associated with the United States-Japan alliance in Japan, see Michael O'Hanlon,
Restructuring U.S. Forces and Bases in Japan, in TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE:
RESTRUC-1URING U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS, supra note 76, at 149, 149-78.
80 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. II.
81 Id. at art. V.
82 Id.
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cumstances that justify SDF actions outside the Japanese archipelago
uncomfortably open-ended in the eyes ofJapan's neighbors.!"
Under the Guidelines, the SDF is permitted to take "appropriate
measures" in cooperation with the United States to respond to situa-
tions in areas surrounding Japan."' These measures are roughly cate-
gorized into two groups: (1) cooperative or unilateral actions, initi-
ated by either government; and (2) support for U.S. military
operations.' The first category comprehends "relief activities and
measures to deal with refugees, search and rescue operations,
evacuation of noncombatants to a safe haven, and enforcement of
economic sanctions.87 This category is comparatively nonproblematic
from an Article 9 standpoint since it tracks the "self-defense" concep-
tualization of the SDF as expressed by Yoshida 8 and recognized in the
1951 Security Treaty.s ' The only question that would arise in any of
these situations is whether the SDF could use force in pursuit of these
activities."'
83 Fisher, supra note 2, at 405. The Chinese, in particular, were concerned that
the Guidelines presented a U.S.-lapanese strategy of containment. It was apparently
with their objections in mind that the Guidelines draft committee included the sen-
tence: "The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to
prevent such situations from occurring." Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. V; see Mike
M. Mochizuki, American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need .for a New Synthesis, in
TOWARD A TRUE ALLIANCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS, supra
note 76, at 74-75 (citing China's suspicions of a policy of containment); Murata, supra
note 22, at 31 (noting that "China became suspicious about the intentions of the
United States and Japan"); see also Ajemian, supra note 8, at 342-48 (arguing that the
United States-Japan alliance needs to be revised, but cautioning that "anytime Japan
considers changing its passive military role to that of an active role, Japan's neighbors
loudr object").' For Korea's reaction, see Fisher, supra note 2, at 407.
Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. V(2).
S5 Id.
86 Id. at art. V(2) (1) (a).
87 Id. at irt. V(2) ( I) (b)-(d).
88 See discussion sunna note 60 and accompanying text (differentiating between
"defense potential" and "war potential").
89 Each of the four activities expressed in Article V(2) (1) are reasonably designed
to "promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter." Security Treaty, supra note 63, at 333 1.
See Fisher, supra note 2, at 406 ("The guidelines do not clarify how much force
Japan can use in any of these scenarios."). For example, could units of the .JASDF
shoot clown hostile planes while evacuatingJapanese nationals from the Korean penin-
sula? The answer, for Article 9 purposes, would most likely hinge upon whether the
hostile planes fired first and whether use of force was absolutely necessary for self-
defense. This approach stands in sharp contrast to that of the international commu-
nity, which has largely accepted the use of force in these kinds of situations. See gener-
ally Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 439
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The second category is far more problematic from an Article 9
standpoint because it permits the SDF to provide rear area support for
U.S. combat operations both within Japan proper and "on the high
seas and international airspace around Japan."'" If one accepts the re-
visionist liberal interpretation of Article 9 that permits the existence of
the SDF, one must also accept the corollary that "self-defense" can
only mean actions carried out in the Japanese archipelago. Other-
wise, as the Chinese delegation to the FEC argued,'9 self-defense is
only a pretext for creating "war potential." That potential, deployed
abroad, would undermine the concept of "self-defense" because the
object of defense would no longer lie within the purview of the de-
ployment. That is, SDF units abroad would conduct their activities
under the Guidelines with the immediate goal of effectuating U.S.
combat operations. Only proximate advantage inures to Japanese se-
curity. Thus the deployment would appear more aggressive than de-
fensive in nature. Under any conventional interpretation, Article 9
stands as an absolute bar to that kind of activity.
If the expanded role of the SDF under the 1997 Guidelines raises
a legitimate question about the constitutionality of the United States-
Japan security arrangement, then the Japanese response to the events
of September 11, 2001, demands an answer that the Diet and the
Japanese court system have heretofore avoided.
III. THE ANTI-TERRORISM SPECIAL MEASURES LAW
On September 12, 2001, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro re-
sponded to the terrorist attacks in the United States by pledging his
government would "spare no effort in providing necessary assistance
and cooperation [to the United States]." ' A week later, Koizumi re-
(2000) (giving a historical overview of the development of this doctrine and examples
of recent evacuations conducted through the use of force).
91 Guidelines, supra note 21, at art. V(2) (2) (b). In addition to providing rear area
support, under the Guidelines Japan is obligated to "conduct such activities as intelli-
gence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to
ensure navigational safety." Id. at art. V(2)(3). Furthermore, Japan will provide, in
case of need, additional temporary facilities for U.S. forces, such as "civilian airports
and ports." Id. at art. V(2) (2) (a).
See supra text accompanying note 47 (noting China's concern that permitting
Japan to maintain armed forces raises the possibility that Japan could employ those
forces under the pretext of self-defense).
93 Koizumi Junichiro, Prime Minister of Japan, Statement at Press Conference
(Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koiztrmispeech/20O1/0912kaiker_
e.html (English translation).
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solved that 'Japan [would] take its own initiative towards the eradica-
tion of terrorism, in cooperation with the United States," and commit-
ted his government to taking measures necessary for the eventual dis-
patch of SDF units.' Apparently the decision to involve the SDF was
prompted by the September 15, 2001, comments of U.S. Deputy Sec-
retary of State Richard Armitage, who bluntly advised the Japanese
ambassador in Washington that Japan should "show the flag" in any
future military action . Ostensibly bound by Article 9, Koizumi's
cabinet then sought to contrive means by which Japan could provide
SDF support "within a scope that [did] not constitute an integral part
of the use of force."' Their efforts culminated on October 29, 2001,
in Diet approval of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law .
'7
The Special Measures Law resembles the 1997 Guidelines in the
latitude it grants the SDF to conduct cooperation and support activi-
ties with the United States, engage in search and rescue operations,
and provide aid (e.g., medical, alimentary) and humanitarian serv-
ices. In addition, the Special Measures Law, like the Guidelines, al-
lows the SDF to provide "supply, transportation, repair and mainte-
nance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services,
and base support" to U.S. forces' The Special Measures Law goes
further than the Guidelines, however, by authorizing the SDF to con-
duct its activities in the territory of foreign countries with the preap-
proval of the foreign nation, and on the "high seas.'.. Likewise, the
prohibition on the use of force is attenuated:
Members of the SelfDefense Forces... may proportionately use weap-
ons when an unavoidable and reasonable cause exists for use of weapons
to protect lives and bodies of themselves... or those who are with them
94 Koizumi junichiro, Prime Minister of Japan, Opening Statement at Press Con-
ference (Sept. 19, 2001), http://ww.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/
0919sourikaikene.html (English translation).
95 Gavan McCormack, Japan's Afghan Expedition, JAPAN WORLD (Nov. 5, 2001), at
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/Afghanexpedition0 l.html; see also Information
Update #58, Pac. Campaign for Disarmament & Sec. (Nov. 1, 2001), at http://
www.isand.net/-pcdsres/58.html (addressing Armitage's comment).
9 U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting, Prime Minister of Japan & His Cabinet (Sept. 25,
2001), at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2001/09/25nitibei_e.html.
97 The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law: Tentative English Summary, supra note 2.
98 Id.
Id. § 4(1) (iii).
I00 d. § 3(3).
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on the scene and have come under their control while conducting their
duties.01
Both the use of force and the expanded operational range of the SDF,
even beyond that sanctioned by the ambiguous "areas surrounding
Japan" language of the 1997 Guidelines, enable Japan's military to be
much more proactive in "defense" than ever before.
The "Basic Plan," required by the Special Measures Law and sub-
sequently issued on November 16, 2001, goes into further detail about
the implementation of the support services the SDF is to provide to
the United States and its allies in the war on terror.0 2 In essence, the
Basic Plan delineates the size and composition of the SDF force tasked
to Diego Garcia, the areas wherein specific operations may be con-
ducted, and a renewable period for the dispatch of forces. 0 3 The Ba-
sic Plan is also careful to underscore the Anti-Terrorism Special Meas-
ures Law's requirement that all support services of the SDF be made
in areas not designated as "combat" zones: "[A]ctivities [shall] be
conducted[] in areas where combat is not taking place, nor [is] ex-
pected to take place throughout the period during which the activities
are conducted, and ... security [shall] be ensured while the activities
are conducted.' ', 4 The reiteration of this point may have been in-
tended to quell fears that the Special Measures Law went too far in
lifting the constitutional restraints on the SDF. For example, the
Asahi Shimbun carried an editorial in its October 30, 2001, issue criti-
101 Id. § 10. Another difference between the 1997 Guidelines and the Special
Measures Law is the fact that it answers in the affirmative a question posed supra note
90. Given a situation where hostile planes threaten the evacuation ofJapanese nation-
als, if the JASDF had to fire upon them to protect the evacuation that action would be
sanctioned by the Special Measures Law. It is important to note, however, that this is
still a limited power. The Special Measures Law stipulates that the use of weapons
"shall not cause harm to persons," except in the unique cases of self-defense or neces-
sity. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law: Tentative English Summay, supra note 2, §
10(4). Whether the broad prescription for "appropriate measures" in the 1997 Guide-
lines was intended to convey a similar right is debatable. It is at least conceivable that
the Guidelines convey such a right, but in the Special Measures Law that possibility is
foreclosed by section 3(2).
102 An English translation of the Basic Plan Regarding Response Measures Based
on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Nov. 16, 2001) is available at http://
www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/200 1/anti-terrorism/I116keikaku_e.html.
103 Id. According to section 2(4), the SDF can deploy a maximum of two supply
ships and three escorts, six transport aircraft and two multipurpose support aircraft,
and "[e]quipment necessary to ensure the security of Self-Defense Forces personnel."
Id. § 2(4)(b)(iii)(2). At any one time, total personnel of the SDF is limited to 1200
persons for theJMSDF and 180 persons for theJASDF. Id. § 2(4) (a).
104 Id. § 2(3) (e).
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cizing the new law as "haphazard" and "rather hasty" for what amounts
to "a major change to Japan's security policy."" '5
Whether the Koizumi cabinet thought it could paper over the
constitutional cracks in the Special Measures Law by crafting a situa-
tion wherein Japanese SDF support could supplement the efforts of
Japan's allies in the war on terror without running the risk of the use
of weapons is immaterial. The SDF may have been contributing to
"endeavors to prevent and eradicate international terrorism in order
to ensure the peace and security of the international community in-
cluding Japan itself,""' but to argue that support of a "war" on terror-
ism is "defensive" is tantamount to claiming that the best defense is a
good offense. Koizumi's description of what the JMSDF was engaged
in when dispatched to Diego Garcia is more akin to a theory of collec-
tive self-defense.
Japan has consistently refused to recognize collective self-defense
as permissible under Article 9.107 Japan's refusal, on constitutional
grounds, to participate in the coalition Gulf War is a prime example
of this limited reading of Article 9 at work.115 Pressed by the United
States to join in the fight to liberate Kuwait, the Diet limited its re-
105 Diet Passes Antilerorrism Special Measures Law, supra note 2, http://www.fpcj.jp/e/
8shiiyo/jb/0145.html (quoting the Asahi Shimbun).
Koizumi Junichiro, Prime Minister of Japan, Statement on the Passing of the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill (Oct. 29, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/
forei ¢n/koizumispeech/2001 / 1029lanwa_e.h tml.
See, e.g., HERZOG, supra note 7, at 231 ("Among the legal fictions invented by
the [Japanese] government in connection with the organisation of armed forces was
the assertion that the constitution prohibited Japan from sending troops abroad and
taking part in collective defense arrangements."); Murata, su/ra note 22, at 32 ("The
right of a collective defense is recognized as indigenous to every sovereignty under the
UN Charter, but according to the Japanese government the Japanese Constitution dis-
allows the government from exercising that right."); Akiho Shibata & Yoshihide Soeya,
Legal Framework, in UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A GUIDE TO
,JAPANESE POLICIES 45, 50 (L. William Heinrich Jr. et al. eds., 1999) ("The government
has consistently maintained that Article 9 bars the SDF from joining the armed forces
of other nations in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. It argues that
Article 9 permits the exercise of self-defence only to the extent necessary to defend
Japanese territory."). In 1954 the Diet passed a nonbinding resolution that prohibited
the dispatch of the SDF units abroad. According to Shigeru Kozai, the main motive
behind the resolution was to obviate the necessity of sending troops abroad to partici-
pate in U.S.-led collective self-defense actions. Shigeru Kozai, UN Peace-Keeping and Ja-
pan: Problens and Prospects, inJAI'AN AND INTFRNATIONAL LAw 29, 31 (Nisuke Ando ed.,
1999).
108 See McCormack, supra note 95, at http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/
Afghanexpedition01.ihtml ("Japan was roundly criticized for having done 'too little,
too late' because it declined on constitutional grotnds to participate in the [Gulf
War's] Multinational Force.").
FROM JAPAN TO AFGHANISTAN
sponse to the contribution of the staggering sum of thirteen billion
dollars. The SDF could not be dispatched, it maintained, because the
Self-Defense Forces Law made the defense of Japanese territorial sov-
ereignty the principal task of the SDF. "' Moreover, 'joint military ac-
tion to defeat, eliminate, and even destroy an aggressor" was facially
contrary to the renunciation of belligerency adduced in Article 9, ex
proprio vigore, even when such action resulted in the ultimate protec-
tion of the state."" The Diet would simply not countenance such a
broad reinterpretation of the "self-defense" exception to Article 9.
Japanese participation in the Gulf War would therefore be limited to
nonoffensive actions, such as bankrolling the coalition's ground
war.
Without adopting a more liberal interpretation of Article 9 that
would permit collective self-defense,"2 the Special Measures Law and
the Basic Plan implementation are likely unconstitutional in the same
way that the proposed dispatch of troops to the Gulf would have been.
Both measures contemplate circumstances where the SDF would be
operating abroad and not in direct defense of the Japanese archipel-
ago. Furthermore, the quintessential Article 9 prohibition against the
"threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" is
probably violated by the authorization for the use of force by the SDF
to protect people who have come under their control in the Special
Measures Law. "Self-defense" seemingly becomes too adumbrative a
concept to meet even liberal interpretations of Article 9 under these
measures. Even if the actual conduct of the SDF abroad is limited to
the noncombat areas mandated by the Special Measures Law and the
Basic Plan, the potential for armed conflict out of necessity alone is
likely too great a prospect to satisfy Article 9. Attempts to reduce the
possibility of combat are largely meaningless, however, because terror-
IM See HERZOG, supra note 7, at 230 ("'The principal task of the Sell-Defence
Forces is to defend our coUntry against direct and indirect aggression."' (quoting arti-
cle 3, paragraph I of the Sel-Defense Forces Law)).
Murata, supra note 22, at 32-33.
See HERZOG, supra note 7, at 231 (describing this maneuver by Japan as "hypo-
critical subterfuge").
112 See, e.g., Murata, supra note 22, at 33 ("Collective defense could instead be un-
derstood as referring to the obligation to conduct joint military action to prevent mili-
tary conflicts and to limit damage should they occur."). Murata suggests that because
this ideation of collective self-defense equates with collective crisis management, it
would be permissible under the Japanese constitution, which does not mention it. Id.
Presumably this argument is based on the theory that expressio unius est exclusio alteious
(expression of one thing is the exclusion of another).
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ism is a series of acts without "combat zones," and the enemy "won't
be able to tell the difference between 'rear' and 'front."""
If the 1997 Guidelines can be read as a move toward a more per-
missive interpretation of Article 9 that includes the right to exercise
collective self-defense through the "areas surrounding Japan" provi-
sion, then the task of determining the constitutionality of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Basic Plan devolves upon Ja-
pan's Supreme Court.'H
IV. THE POLICY OF AVOIDANCE: ARTICLE 9, THE SDF, AND THE
JAPANESE JUDICIARY
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court-activist or otherwise-the
Japanese Supreme Court has pursued a policy of extreme deference
to the legislature in exercising judicial review.'1  Although it is
charged with safeguarding the "constitutional democracy and funda-
mental rights of the people," the court gives priority to "public peace
and order.'" In part, deference to the legislature is the product of
the Japanese Supreme Court's acceptance of the political question
doctrine, which holds that all questions of a purely political nature,
such as the conclusion of treaties, are within the power of the political
department (i.e., Diet and Cabinet) and therefore outside the judicial
power. In addition, the Japanese legal system is structured such that
legal trainees who favor government policies "self-select" careers in
the judiciary and are advanced through the judicial hierarchy to the
extent that they support government preferences in their disposition
of cases."" Most cases potentially involving a constitutional question
S13 Infonnation Update #58, supra note 95 (comments of Umebayashi Hiromichi); at
http://www.isliad.net/-pcdsres/58.h tml.
114 KENPO art. 81 (Japan) ("The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.").
115 See generally MIKIIIISA TAKANO, TIlE THEORY OF AVOIDING DECISION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT IN
AMERICAN COURTS AND JAPANESE COURTS (1992) (criticizing the Japanese Supreme
Court's tendency of self-restraint and urging it to take a more activist role).
116 ld. at 33.
117 1(. at 104-05 ("[T]he courts should admit and respect the determination made
by the political department. That is to say, political question,. are non-justiciable."); see
also HIROSIHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 159-75
(1989) (discussing the self-restraint of'the Japanese Supreme Court).
il8 SeeJ. MARK RAMSENER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 16-20 (1999) (explaining that the structure of the Japanese judiciary "gives
judges an incentive to act in those ways that the people deciding their transfers con-
sider appropriate"); J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTFI, JAPAN'S
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will therefore be resolved on as narrow grounds as possible to avoid
having to answer the constitutional question. As a result, the Japa-




The following series of cases illustrates the court's approach to the
SDF, Article 9, and the United States-Japan security relationship.21
A. The Sunakawa Case
In 1959 the Japanese Supreme Court heard the case of Sakata v.
Japan (Sunakawa).'1= The suit involved seven villagers of the town of
Sunakawa who objected to the proposed expansion of Tachikawa Air
Base, a U.S. military facility established pursuant to the 1951 Security
Treaty. The villagers destroyed fences and interfered with a survey of
the property conducted by the Japanese government. They were ar-
rested for trespassing on a U.S. installation but were acquitted on the
grounds that the law under which the arrests were made was nugatoty.
In a hugely controversial decision, the Tokyo District Court held that
the Security Treaty of 1951, the basis for the U.S. presence in Japan,
was unconstitutional because it was in effect maintenance of "land,
POLITICAl. MARKETPLACE 14 (1993) ("LDP leaders appoint to the apex of thejudiciary
only those who are politically reliable .... ); see also HIROSI ODA,JAPANESE LAW 95-99
(1992) (discussing the Japanese judiciay in general terms).
119 TAKANO, supra note 115, at 47-65 (discussing the adjudicative practice of case
in controversy" self-restraint in the United States and Japan).
1 Id. at 33-34 ("Since the birth of the Supreme Court under the Constitution of
Japan in 1946, there have been only three or four cases where the Supreme Court has
held legislative statutes or acts of government unconstitutional.").
121 My summary of each case is drawn from the following sources: HERZOG, supra
note 7, at 236-39; Ajemian, supra note 8, at 328-30; Auer, supra note 2, at 80-82; Fisher,
supra note 2, at 409-13; Gilley, supra note 16, at 1699-1703. Citation is made where ap-
propriate.
22 The case is reported at 13 Keisha 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., 1959), and reprinted in
English translation in 4JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LW 103 (19FO). The so-
called Sunakawa case was not the first to test the legality of the SDF. That distinction
belongs to the Eniwa case, Japan v. Nozaki Bros., which is reported in 9-3 Kakya keish a
359 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Mar. 29, 1967). Eniwa involved two dairy farmers in the town
of Eniwa, Chitose, Hokkaido, who Cut telephone wires leading to an SDF base. The
farmers had been disturbed by SDF maneuvers at the base, including the use of explo-
sive devices. They were indicted under the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 121, which
provided punishment for "any person who destroys or damages... things supplied for
defense." See TAKANO, supra note 115, at 47-48 (summarizing Eniwa). In defense of
their action, the farmers questioned the constitutionality of the SDF under Article 9.
The court found that the phone lines did not constitute "things supplied for defense,"
and acquitted the farmers without reaching the constitutional question they had
raised. Id. at 48-49.
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sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential," in contravention of
Article 9. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the acquittal was
reversed. The court held that self-defense was not denied by Article 9
as a sovereign right of the nation, but avoided answering the question
of whether the U.S. presence was legal on the grounds that the issue
was "political": "[A]ny legal determination as to whether the content
of the [Security Treaty] was constitutional was in many respects in-
separably related to the political considerations or discretionary power
of the cabinet, which concluded the treaty, and on the part of the Diet
which concluded it.'
2 3
B. The Nike Debacle
From 1973 to 1982 a case challenging the decision of the Ministry
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries to reclassify part of a forest re-
serve in order to permit the SDF to build a Nike anti-aircraft missile
base near Naganuma, Hokkaido was litigated in the Sapporo District
and High Courts, and eventually the Japanese Supreme Court.'' The
plaintiffs, all local residents, argued that they derived direct benefits
from the forest reserve, including a supply of irrigation and drinking
water and protection from floods.'2 5 The reclassification scheme, they
alleged, illegally deprived them of those rights. In addition, they con-
tended that the intended use of the reclassified section, to build a
Nike base, was per se unconstitutional under Article 9 because it
qualified as "war potential." In a surprisingly activist decision, the
Sapporo District Court agreed with the plaintiffs. The court held:
Viewed in terms of its organization, scale, equipment and capabilities,
the SDF is a military force, since it is clearly "an organization of men and
material which has as its purpose combat activity involving physical force
against a foreign threat." Accordingly, the Ground, Maritime, and Air
SDF correspond to the "war potential" of "land, sea, and air forces,"
maintenance of which is forbidden by Article 9, [Paragraph] 2, of the
Constitution. 
24;
123 Gilley, suira note 16, at 1700 (quoting an English translation of Snakawa pro-
vided in KENNETi L. POWR, COMPARATIVE LAw: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN
107 (1996)).
214 The case is Ito v. Minister of Agicutture, Forestry and Fisheries, and is reported in
.Japanese at 712 HANREI jiHo 24 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973); 27 GOSAI REISI-O
1175 (Sapporo High Ct., Aug. 5, 1976); 36 MINSIHO 1679 (Sup. Ct., 1st Petty Bench,
Sept. 9, 1982). For translations of the courts' opinions, with intioductory notes, see
BEER & ITOH I, sutpa note 12, at 83-130.
12, BEER & ITOH I, supra note 12, at 83.
126 /d. at I 11.
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The decision of the Sapporo District Court was immediately ap-
pealed and promptly reversed by the Sapporo High Court. On review,
the high court found that the benefits lost by reclassification of the
forest reserve had been remedied at the time of the Nike base con-
struction.2 7 Because there was no harm to the plaintiffs, their first
claim was "not justiciable.', 2  This decision effectively dismissed the
claim because it deprived the plaintiffs of standing, but the high court
also addressed the district court's finding that the SDF was unconstitu-
tional. After a rather tortured analysis of whether the SDF's purpose
was "aggressive," in pertinent part the high court held:
[T]he problem of whether or not the existence, and so on of the SDF
conforms to Article 9 of the Constitution is a decision concerning state
governance, and as a political act of the Diet and Cabinet would ulti-
mately be entrusted to the political judgment of the entire people. It
should not be construed to be a matter that courts are to determine.' 
2
The Japanese Supreme Court agreed with the Sapporo High Court,
but did not reach the issue of the SDF's constitutionality or consider
the "purpose" test applied at the district and high court levels. "
C. The Hyakuri Air Base Case
In Ishizuka v. Japan,""' the SDF began purchasing land in lbaragi
Prefecture to build aJASDF base. Residents in the area opposed the
SDF's plan and, in order to stymie it, agreed to purchase land that
would be essential to the base's construction and then refuse to sell it
to the SDF. One farmer who sold his land to participants in this
scheme rescinded his contract of sale when the opposition group
failed to make final payment. He then sold the land to the SDF. The
first sale, however, had clouded the title to the land and the farmer
and the SDF brought suit to have the land registration corrected."
:2
The opposition group raised the constitutionality of the SDF as a de-
fense, arguing that the subsequent purchase was a nullity.
127 Id. at 114.
128 /d.
129 d. at 122.
130 See id. at 122-30 (containing a translation of the Japanese Supreme Court's
opinion of the case).
131 The case is reported in 43 MINSI10 385 (Sup. Ct., 3d Petty Bench, June 20,
1989). A translation of the pertinent parts may be iound in BEER & ITOH I, supra note
12, at 130-41.
132 BEER& ITOH, supra note 12, at 130-31.
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The Mito District Court disagreed, holding that the SDF could
purchase the land. In response to the opposition group's claim that
the SDF was unconstitutional, the court invoked the political question
doctrine to avoid deciding whether the size, organization, and capa-
bilities of the SDF violated Article 9.'" It went further than any previ-
ous court, however, in stating that the idea of the SDF, by itself, was
constitutional: "'[T]he use of the right of self-defense for the purpose
of preventing and eliminating armed foreign attacks and for organiz-
ing and equipping effective and appropriate defense dispositions in
advance does not violate Article 9 of the Constitution."""" On appeal,
both the Tokyo High Court and the Japanese Supreme Court af-
firmed the Mito District Court's opinion, but neither court reached
the constitutional claims of the opposition group, preferring to cate-
gorize the action as merely a contract dispute.
: 5
D. X v.Japan
The most recent case to invoke Article 9 did not address the SDF
directly; rather it attacked the decision by Prime Minister Kaifu To-
shiki's cabinet to give thirteen billion dollars to the coalition armies
involved in the Gulf War."' One thousand sixty-seven citizens filed
suit in Tokyo District Court alleging that the government's contribu-
tion to a war effort violated their rights as taxpayers. Despite being
"flush with money" in 1991, the enormous amount pledged by the
Japanese government had required special taxes to raise enough
money to cover Japan's contribution.' 7 Article 17 of the constitution
gives standing to every citizen who has suffered damage through the
illegal acts of a public official.'3 " The plaintiffs claimed that Japan's
monetary support of the Gulf War was equivalent to participation in
the war and therefore illegal under Article 9. They further claimed
Auer, supra note 2, at 81.
1I hi. (quoting in translation 43 MINSI-O 385).
35 See Auer, supra note 2, at 82 (noting the courts' conclusions that "Article 9 does
not a/pply directly to private acts");see alto Ajemian, sup/ra note 8, at 330 (same).
The case is available at 40 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT'L L. 125 (1997) (reprinting
the English translation of the case originally reported in Japanese as 62 H.J. 1579 (To-
kyo Dist. Ct., May 10, 1996)). An additional claim challenged the dispatch ofJMSDF
minesweepers to the region long after hostilities had ended, but as that will be dis-
cussed in/'ra Part V, the analysis here concentrates solely on the tax claim.
1:7 See McCormack, supra note 95, at http://www.iwanami.co.jp/ipworld/text/
Afghanexpedition0l.htmil (comparing the Kaifu and the Koizumi pledges to support
iorei 11 military action).
KENI'O art. 17 (Japan).
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that they were harmed by the tax levied to underwrite that support.V4
The Tokyo District Court, perhaps predictably, dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claims without addressing the underlying constitutional claim in
any depth. It held that the right the plaintiffs complained had been
infringed-a right to "peaceful existence" on the basis of Article 9-
was too indefinite to be damaged. 40 Moreover, the constitutionality of
the Kaifu contribution to the Gulf War, the court seemed to suggest,
was essentially a political question and therefore subject to a presump-
tion of constitutionality.
4'
Taken together, the string of cases dealing with the SDF, Article 9,
and the United States-Japan security relationship suggests that the
Japanese Supreme Court, while not taking a clear constitutional
stance, recognizes a permissible purpose for the SDF in the defense of
Japanese sovereignty. If the court considers the SDF unconstitutional,
it certainly has had ample opportunity to so hold. The existence of
the SDF is just one consequence of the court's avoidance of defini-
tively deciding the constitutional question.
Continued reliance on the political question doctrine, however,
makes discerning the extent of SDF constitutionality extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible. For example, the court in X v. Japan gave the
same degree of deference under Article 9 to an international act as
the appellate court in the Nike debacle gave to a purely domestic
act.4 2 The only attempt at limiting the constitutionality of a putative
self-defense force, in the Nike anti-aircraft base case, was the Sapporo
High Court's "aggressive purpose" test, which the Japanese Supreme
Court did not adopt.14" ' Thus, a further consequence of judicial defer-
ence to the political question doctrine is the "unfettered power by the
Cabinet and the Diet to determine defense policy.""14 Unless the Su-
preme Court of Japan adopts a less deferential approach to judicial
review, it will be left to the Diet to determine the proper role of the
SDF, and as a result the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law will find
its ultimate interpretation there.
139 Gilley, supra note 16, at 1712-13.
140 Id. at 1714.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 1715 ("[T]he opinion in [X v. Japan] indicates that Japanese courts
will apply the same presumption of validity to the government's international acts that
they apply to primarily domestic acts, when international acts are challenged on Article
9 principles.").
143 Fisher, supra note 2, at 413-14.
144 Id. at 413.
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V. GAI-ATSu: FOREIGN PRESSURE AND DIET DECISION MAKING
The Japanese Diet, like all representative legislative bodies, com-
prises individuals seeking reelection. Given this truism, it is somewhat
surprising to look at the history of the SDF and the multiple interpre-
tations of Article 9 and realize that at every point in the SDF's evolu-
tion, from police force to military, the impetus for change has been
Japan's bilateral security partner, the United States. Japanologists re-
fer to this phenomenon as gai-atsu, or "outside pressure," and it is of-
ten used as an excuse by the government tojustify unpopular domes-
tic and international policies."" Reducing the barriers to foreign
market competition at the expense of domestic industry in order to
benefit consumers is one example of such outside pressure. " An-
other is the Kishi cabinet's negotiation over the Mutual Cooperation
and Security Treaty, which, while popular with U.S. military planners,
was wildly unpopular in Japan and sparked riots. 4 7 In these situations
and others, the Japanese government acquiesced to the will of the
United States and, in so doing, ignored the needs of its own domestic
agenda.
Outside pressure on the Diet to "show the flag" in the interna-
tional community had been building in tandem with the stratospheric
rise ofJapan's economy. In 1991 that pressure prompted Prime Min-
ister Kaifu's reinterpretation of the Self-Defense Forces Law in order
to dispatch JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, long after hos-
tilities had (essentially) ceased.""' The decision proved fractious in Ja-
1 Set. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Japanese Attit'udes Towards Foreign Policy, in THE
PROCESS OF JAPANE.SE FOREIGN POLIK 123, 134 (Richard L. Grant ed., 1997) ("To the
extent that public opinion influencesJapanese foreign policy at all, it is more likely to
be foreign than domestic public opinion.").
14,; Id. at 135. AlthotIgh policies that reduce the price of consumer goods would
inttuitively be popular, reduction or elimination of domestic industries entails
workforce reductions and the potential for loss of entire sectors of the domestic econ-
omy. These are strong disincentives for the politician seeking reelection, and I doubt
that any candidate would evince such an improbably insouciant attitude toward domes-
tic industry's concern in the absence of foreign pressure.
147 See HOOK & MCCORMACK, sufpra note 26, at 21 (noting that opinion polls
"showed substantial support for either unarmed neutrality or dependence on the UN
rather than the security treaty with the US"). For a description of the Kishi govern-
ment's negotiations with the United States and subsequent downfall, see I.M. DESTLER
ET AL., MANAGING AN ALI,.IANCE: THE POLITICS OF U.S.-JAI'ANESE RELATIONS 12-23
(1976).
1.1 Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces Law permits the JMSDF to remove mines
from "the sea," but does not define the geographical area therein described. Kaifu ar-
gued, successftlly as it turned out in the case against him, that this ambiguity allowed
the JMSDF to operate both in Japanese territorial and international waters. UNITED
FROM JAPAN TO AFGHANISTAN
pan and resulted in litigation, but the court in X v. Japan gave Kaifu
the benefit of the political question doctrine to uphold the deploy-
ment."'' The dispatch of minesweepers and the thirteen billion dollar
contribution to the coalition effort in the Middle East did little to as-
suage foreign criticism thatJapan had done "too little, too 
late.",5 0
Foreign criticism of Japan's commitment to the international
community during the Gulf War culminated in the 1992 promulga-
tion of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations Law.' 5' In consideration of
Article 9, the law severely circumscribes the range of activities in which
the SDF can take part. In general, these activities are logistical in na-
ture, although with Diet approval they may include monitoring cease-
fires; patrolling buffer zones; facilitating the exchange of prisoners of
war; and performing weapons inspection, collection, and disposal."2
The law also places strict limitations on SDF deployment in foreign
countries in the form of five "principles" of participation. Three of
the principles are preconditions: (1) a cease-fire must be in place and
actively maintained among the host countries; (2) the host countries
must consent to the SDF participation; and (3) the United Nations
must be impartial in the dispute. Two additional principles are pro-
cedural: (4) use of arms is limited to cases of self-defense or necessity
and may not be ordered by the United Nations; and (5) in the event
of a "suspension or termination" of any of the three preconditions,
the SDF's participation ends.'5  The five principles are geared toward
minimizing the possibility that Japanese forces will find themselves in
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONs: A GUIDE TO JAPANESE POLICIES, supra. note 107,
at 51.
149 See Gilley, sufpa note 16, at 1713-14 (noting that while the plaintiffs' right to a
peaceful existence can be found in the Japanese constitution, the court found the
right ambiguous enough to justify reserving the question of content to the legislative
body).
150 McCormack, supra note 95, at http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/
Afghanexpedition01.html; see also UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A
GUIDE TO JAPANESE POLICIES, supra note 107, at 19 (noting the strong criticism ofJa-
pan's role in the Gulf War by the United States and some European countries).
1r. Kokusai reng6 heiwa iji katsui5 t0 ni iaisuru kyOyoku ni kansurnt horitsu (Law Con-
cerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Opera-
tions), Act No. 79 of 1992 (Japan), translated in UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS: A GUIDE TOJAPANESE POLICIES, supra note 107, at annex I1.
'152 Gilley, supra note 16, at 1705.
153 See UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A GUIDE TO JAPANESE
POLICIES, supra note 107, at 61-65 (enumerating the "five principles" of Japanese par-
ticipation).
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a situation that would require the "use or threat of force."' 5" In sum,
the law attempts to strike a balance between the SDF's legitimation
Linder Article 9 and the outside pressure to contribute more to the in-
ternational community.
The U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations Law was passed with little
popular support and against the "fierce opposition" of Japan's op-
position parties. 1% By the time it went into effect, however, a majority
of the Japanese public accepted the expanded role of the SDF under
the law.' 7 This change of heart suggests that the Diet will not feel
constrained by popular opinion to further revise and reorient the
SDF's mission from the limited purpose of "self-defense" of the Japa-
nese home islands to the vague "collective self-defense" of interna-
tional order desired by foreign governments. Even if the public sen-
timent is accorded weight in the Diet's decision-making process, the
polls reflect approval of the existence of the SDF and the LDP's push
for SDF international participation .'" The main opposition party, the
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), acknowledged this trend
with its announcement in 1994 that it would no longer argue that the
SDF and the security arrangement with the United States were uncon-
stitutional, a concession which leaves theJCP and a handful of splinter
factions within the LDP as the sole voices of opposition to the liberal
interpretation of Article 9. 159
154 See id. at 51 ("When considering the constitutionality of SDF participation in, or
cooperation with, UN peace operations abroad, the key question is whether SDF duties
will involve the use or threat of force.").
155 See HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 26, at 32 (positing that popular stIpport
for the law before its adoption was no higher than 36% of those polled).
156 Hisashi Owada, Remarks at the 90th Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law (Mar. 27, 1996), in90 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 42, 43 (1996).
157 See HOOK& MCCORMACK, sulpra note 26, at 32 (stating that popular support for
the law had risen to 52% after the first dispatch ofJGSDF troops Cambodia in 1992).
The Japanese public may have been prepared to accept an expanded role for the SDF
in any event. See EDWARDJ. LINCOLN, JAPAN'S NEW GLOBAL ROLE 264 (1993) (citing a
poll by Nihon Keizai Shinibun, which found that 70% of Japanese surveyed before the
Gulf War supported SDF participation in international humanitarian work).
I' Cf. HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 26, at 32 (observing that up to 70% of the
public supports revision of the constitution to clarify the role of the SDF); Mike M.
Mochizuki, A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance, in TOWARD A TRUE ALIANCE:
RESTRUCTURING U.S.-JAPAN SECURI'IY RELATIONS, sulra note 76, at 5, 33 (noting that
33.4% of Diet members support the move toward greater military cooperation with the
United States).
159 See HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 26, at 29-30 (describing the dramatic
compromise by the SDPJ).
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In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, public approval
of a more active role for the SDF has become even more pronounced
in opinion polls. According to surveys conducted by the Asahi Shim-
bun and the Mainichi Shimbun, between fifty-one and fifty-seven per-
cent of respondents favored the dispatch of JMSDF units called for by
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, with seventy-one percent in
support of closer cooperation with the United States in antiterrorism
measures. With the confluence of gai-atsu to join the war on terror
and significant domestic approval supporting the Anti-Terrorism Spe-
cial Measures Law and the Basic Plan, it is therefore unlikely that the
Diet will do more than nominally observe the strictures of Article 9, as
in the U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations Law. Without the check of ju-
dicial review, the SDF, itself a product of outside pressure, will proba-
bly continue its progression from a "self-defense" force to a full-
fledged military under the new measures, irrespective of Article 9.
VI. DEJURE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM SPECIAL
MEASURES LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARTICLE 9 AND THE
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
A. The Future of Article 9
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law invests the SDF with the
responsibility of carrying Japan's burden of collective self-defense. Al-
though the law was carefully tailored by the Koizumi cabinet to avoid
overt deviation from Article 9, the reality is that the expanded opera-
tional abilities, both geographic and military, materially diverge from
the spirit of the "no war" clause. The limited exception to Article 9
has recognized a place for "self-defense," but the Japanese govern-
ment has long argued that the exception, together with the right of
collective self-defense, is confined to a protective force operating in
the Japanese archipelago that can use its weapons only when fired
upon. The Japanese judiciary has deferred the question of the consti-
tutionality of this exception to the Japanese legislature. The Diet
should therefore take steps to clarify the SDF position under Article 9.
This is especially important when, as in the case of the Special Meas-
ures Law, the Diet has fundamentally altered the purpose of the SDF.
There are three possible courses that government action may take:
(1) repeal Article 9; (2) amend Article 9 to reflect the Diet's liberal
160 McCormack, supra note 95, at http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jipworld/text/
Afghanexpedition0l .html.
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interpretation of the language justifying the existence of the SDF and
the concept of collective self-defense; or (3) continue to read into the
ambiguities introduced by the Ashida Amendment the desired de-
fense policy without changing the constitution. Of these three ap-
proaches, only the first two provide any clarification of the SDF's con-
stitutional position. The first course of action would make the SDF
legal without qualification, but it is extremely unlikely since a majority
of the Japanese people support the ideal expressed in Article 9 and
feel it is an important part of the Japanese national identity."" Fur-
thermore, repeal would require a two-thirds majority in each house of
the Diet and the support of a national referendum, both of which pre-
sent bars much too high for the government to overcome.
The second course, by way of contrast, is much more likely be-
cause Japanese public sentiment is for the first time beginning to favor
revision of the constitution, including Article 9, with clarification of
the SDF's role as a major goal.' 6 With little opposition remaining in
the Diet to the expanded role of the SDF under the U.N. Peace-
Keeping Operations Law, the 1997 Guidelines, and the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law, the conditions are ripe for propos-
ing an amendment that will maintain the spirit of the prohibition
against "war" while recognizing the right of the Japanese to have a
military that can take part in collective self-defense actions. This is es-
pecially true given the overwhelming support of the populace for SDF
participation in the war on terror."': Although amendment would by
no means be assured, approximately ninety percent of the Japanese
people support the SDF and an expanded role for Japanese forces
abroad,"4 suggesting that the probability of amendment is higher now
than it has ever been before.
The third course of action the Diet might take is to continue rede-
fining the "self-defense" exception to Article 9 without modifying the
constitution. This method is plainly unacceptable from an interna-
tional standpoint. In the international arena, Article 9 has acted as a
See Fisher, supra note 2, at 415 ("[T]he Japanese people today embrace paci-
fism as part of their national identity.... Thus, despite the problems of living with Ar-
ticle 9, the Japanese people are generally committed to its preservation.").
162 See HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 26, at 32 (explaining that the majority of
those people polled supported constitutional revision in large part to make an interna-
tional contribution).
See McCormack, suipra note 95, at http://www.iwanami.co.jp/pworl1/text/
Afghanexpedition01.html (reporting the increase in public support for SDF participa-
tion following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks).
i64 Auer, supra note 2, at 83.
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safety device to forestall the full remilitarization of Japan, a prospect
that provokes anxiety in Japan's neighbors.' "6 To continue to expand
the "self-defense" exception without changing the constitution "hol-
lows out" the prohibition and makes the promise of an eternal renun-
ciation of war an empty one..' Clarification is absolutely essential in
this situation, lest the ever-expanding definition of "self-defense" one
day encompass the pretext for war about which the Chinese delega-
tion to the FEC complained. 7 In addition, the vaguely defined op-
erational capabilities of the SDF under Article 9 provide an "out" for a
Japanese cabinet to avoid international commitments it might other-
wise have been obligated to fulfill-for example the refusal to send
SDF units to join the coalition army in the Gulf War. The interna-
tional community needs to be convinced that Japan, as the world's
second largest economy, will be an active part of global action aimed
at the preservation of peace and order, rather than a passive observer
and beneficiary.
The Japanese government has been sensitive to criticism that it
has been a "free rider" in international affairs, and has taken steps to
remedy the problem with the U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations Law
and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law." " Revision of the con-
stitution is an explosively divisive issue, however, and the government
may not seek to amend or repeal Article 9 for that reason. Whatever
course of action the government takes, the end result is that the Arti-
cle 9 "no war" provision will no longer stand as an absolute bar to mili-
tary action, nor as an inherent limitation on the SDF's role in collec-
tive self-defense arrangements. In this regard, the Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Law model represents the future.
I65 Supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See HOOK & MCCORMACK, su/qra note 26, at 17, 21 (discussing the expansion of
military capability almost immediately after the inception of Article 9, and how SDF
activities "hollow[] out" the article).
167 Ian Buruma cites this as a rationale for revision of the constitution. Mr. Bti-
ruma's reasoning is persuasive, particularly with regard to the nexus between Article 9
and the denial of war guilt by Japanese revisionists. See Ian Buruma, Perilous Underside
ofJapai n's Paciism, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at B1 I ("[S]olving the [Article 9] issue
would rob the revanchist right wing of its argument for denying Japan's belligerent
past .... The alternative [is] for the Japanese to rearm-and possibly go nuclear-in
a fit of panic, without proper debate or democratic checks and balances.").
See supra Part V (detailing Japan's efforts to contribute to international collec-
tive support).
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B. The Future of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law will likely strengthen
the United States-Japan alliance in the twenty-first century, at least for
the law's two-year duration. An SDF with expanded operational capa-
bilities will be able to augment U.S. military actions in the Asia-Pacific
theater and in the war on terror more effectively through the provi-
sion of important rear area support. Furthermore, by committing it-
self to providing contemporaneous material support to U.S. forces
rather than a contribution to the U.S. war chest, the Japanese Diet has
made the SDF an integral part of U.S. strategic planning. Japanese
cooperation with the U.S. military reaffirms the reciprocal spirit of the
1960 Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and elevates Japan from
the role ofjunior partner in the relationship.
A necessary consequence of Japan's expanded participation in the
security arrangement will be the correspondingly increased influence
Japanese strategists and legislators will have over U.S. policy in the
Asia-Pacific theater. The 1997 Guidelines were aimed at increasing
the level of coordination on policy issues between the two nations as
the alliance shifted its meaning in the post-Cold War world. In prac-
tice, the. obligation to consult the Japanese on policy decisions has not
been fulfilled by the United States. One recent example is the deci-
sion by President Bush to include North Korea in the "Axis of Evil," a
designation that came as a shock to Japanese legislators looking to
normalize relations with that country. "' ' With a greater stake in the
collective defense of peace in "areas surrounding Japan," however, Ja-
pan ensures that Washington will pay closer attention to the opinions
and policy goals of its ally.
The expanded role that the SDF will play in the alliance will also
force the United States to rethink its security arrangements with other
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, were war to break
out on the Korean peninsula, the United States would be obligated to
intervene on behalf of its allies in the South. TheJapanese would also
participate in the conflict by virtue of the probable use of Japanese
bases by the United States in prosecuting its intervention and the "ar-
eas surrounding Japan" provisions of the 1997 Guidelines. If the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measures Law is a model for the operational pa-
l69 See, e.g., Koizurnis Pyongtang Visit a Risky Business, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002
("North Korea's inclusion by Washington in ... the 'axis of evil' does not help rela-
tions [between Japan and North Korea.]"), http://www.atines.com/atimes/Japan/
DI 13Dh03.html.
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rameters of SDF support, the Japanese may find themselves in situa-
tions in which they are forced to fire upon North Koreans. One can
easily imagine a scenario wherein ajapanese minesweeper is tasked to
Inchon harbor, only to be attacked by elements of the North Korean
navy. Under these circumstances the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law would permit the JMSDF to return fire and thereby broaden the
conflict. South Korea undoubtedly has no interest in witnessing Japa-
nese military intervention on the peninsula and will object to the SDF
presence. For that reason the United States must walk a fine line be-
tween encouraging the expanded capabilities of the SDF and prevent-
ing their deployment in areas that would impair Washington's rela-
tionships with third-party nations.
CONCLUSION
There is every reason to expect that the Anti-Terrorism Special
Measures Law represents the future of Japan's international military
cooperation. With the dispatch of three ships to Diego Garcia, the
Diet continued the policy of reinterpretation of Article 9 and the
proper role of the SDF in the post-Cold War security environment.
Foreign pressure, popular support, and a judiciary that has left the
constitutionality of the SDF and its purposes under Article 9 to the
Diet and Cabinet ensure that Japanese legislators will be able to con-
tinually reinterpret the SDF's mission in the years to come. Yet, as the
SDF increasingly takes on responsibilities that cannot be squared with
the concept of "self-defense," the Diet will be forced to confront the
inherent inconsistency of a military in a nominally pacifist state.
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is a challenge to the
Diet to either revise the Japanese constitution or scale back the scope
of SDF capabilities. Amendment of Article 9 would be an ignomini-
ous end for the world's only "peace constitution," even if the revision
merely clarified the role of the SDF at home and abroad. Neverthe-
less, Japan exists among a community of nations and has obligations
to the world beyond the maintenance of its pacifist ideal. Japan risks
the condemnation of the free world when it conducts "checkbook di-
plomacy," as in the Gulf War. Furthermore, Japan's pockets are no
longer as deep as they were in 1991. The SDF should participate in
collective actions designed to improve an international peace based
on justice and order. That idea is consistent with the aspiration of Ar-
ticle 9, and provides the premise for a future Article 9 that legitimates
the SDF while continuing to renounce aggressive war. The tough
choice between these alternatives is unenviable, but Japanese legisla-
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tors absolutely must make the choice ifJapan is to become a "normal"
nation. 70
170 The term "normal nation" as used here was first employed by Ozawa Ichiro to
describe the kind of state that he believed Japan must aspire to become through con-
stitutional revision. The hallmark traits of the "normal nation" according to Ozawa
are: (1) a willingness to shoulder responsibilities regarded as natural in the interna-
tional community, irrespective of domestic political difficulties; and (2) cooperation
with the international community in remedying worldwide problems affecting the sta-
bility of the lives of its people, such as pollution. ICHIRO OZAWA, BLUEPRINT FOR A
NEW JAPAN: THE RETHINKING OF A NATION 94-95 (1994). The term is stIfticiently
broad to encompass the kind of change this Comment contemplates.
